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FOREWORD 
 
Prophecies of the long-term decline of violent conflict in our world appear to have been put on hold this 
past year.  Civil war now rages in western Ukraine, and Islamic State has made dramatic advances deep 
into Iraq.  Other major conflicts continue to drag on in South Sudan, Syria, the Central African Republic, 
Afghanistan, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere around the world, inflicting a 
litany of human rights abuses and suffering upon ordinary people and soldiers alike.  And yet, if we can 
take anything from such human failure and despair, it is that it reinforces the importance of trying to 
learn about why and how widespread violence occurs, and, most importantly, how to stop it and 
prevent it from occurring in the future. 
This year’s top students from Managing Conflict in the Developing World – emerging scholars all – have 
set their minds to exactly that task, analysing the complexity of a variety of conflicts and approaches to 
resolving conflict. 
Some have focused on specific and current arenas of violence:  Nicole Tape looks at Afghanistan and the 
prospects for the country once the international force has left, concluding that negotiating with the 
Taliban will be unavoidable if lasting peace is to be obtained; Lara Miles unpicks the troubled attempts 
at a mediation process in the Syrian civil war, a process that cannot but be even more fraught with the 
spillover of conflict into Iraq; Megan Lowe looks at the advantages and disadvantages that flowed from 
adopting an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide; and Corinne 
Langman explains the twisted sociological underpinnings to the horror that is sexual violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Others of our emerging scholars have adopted a more cross-cutting approach: Brendan Garrett 
contemplates the role of aid – a Gordian knot in and of itself – in conflict resolution; Sarah Jenkin-Hall 
highlights the scope for the International Criminal Court to develop its pre-emptive and preventive 
capacities; and Kristian Le Gallou analyses peacebuilding as an approach to conflict resolution, using the 
case study of the Central African Republic to demonstrate how the efficacy of peacebuilding can be 
improved in practice. 
I commend this year’s top students from Managing Conflict in the Developing World on their essays, and 
also commend their work to you.  These students have continued the tradition established by the good 
work of last year’s emerging scholars.  To improve our ability to avert the pervasive torment that civil 
war brings, we continue to need new ideas from fresh minds.  The demand for work by emerging 
scholars such as Nicole, Lara, Megan, Corinne, Brendan, Sarah and Kristian is thus both pressing and 
important.  I thank them for their valuable contributions and hope that their insights can, in their own 
modest way, help us to understand how we can make the world a better place. 
Continuing to strive together – 
 
Michael Cornish, December 2014  
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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AID 
by Brendan Garrett 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The current international response to conflict is complex in nature, and involves many different types of 
institutions, mandates, rules of engagement, decision-making structures and capabilities.1 The aim of 
this paper is to look at the role international aid plays in conflict management and to seek to understand 
to what extent it can be an effective tool in reducing conflict in the developing world. This will be 
undertaken firstly through a brief discussion of the nature of conflict and aid. Next, an analysis of the 
particular strengths and weaknesses of international aid will be provided, leading towards an 
examination of how it may be combined with other conflict management techniques in order to 
increase its effectiveness. Additionally, this paper will then discuss the potential of implementing such 
an approach in a conflict scenario – in this case, the Federal Republic of Somalia – as a way to 
demonstrate the possibility for its practical implementation. 
 
THE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND AID 
Aid can take on different forms such as complex, long-term rehabilitation programs, relief operations for 
those whose lives are directly threatened, operations aimed at preventing violations of human rights, 
and limited, one-time operations.2 Thus, before discussing how effective aid is in regards to conflict 
management, it is important to first define what ‘aid’ means in this context and what it includes. 
Considering such differentiation, it seems most useful to retain a broad definition, and one that is less 
restrictive; thus, this paper will define ‘aid’ as “transfers from one or more governments to another for 
the purpose of economic, social, and political development”.3 
Before understanding how effective aid can be in managing conflict, it is helpful to also gain a better 
understanding of the nature of conflict, as well as the nature of aid. This is imperative, as the actual 
                                                          
1
 P. Aall, 2000, “NGOs, conflict management and peacekeeping”, International Peacekeeping 7(1): 121-141. 
2
 P. Perrin, 1998, “The impact of humanitarian aid on conflict development”, International Review of the Red Cross 38(323): 
319-333. 
3
 R. A. Nielsen et al., 2011, “Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict”, American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 
219-232. 
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understanding of conflict inevitably shapes the response. In other words, if there is a poor or limited 
understanding, then there will most likely also be a poor or limited response. Whereas most conflicts a 
century ago were between states, most conflicts today take place within states, with the nature of 
conflict fragmented, dispersed, and context-specific (highlighted later in this paper through the example 
of Somalia).4 As Picciotto pointed out, it is also useful to recognise that contrary to past wars that 
arguably strengthened the state, the new wars aim to undermine it.5 
In the developing world of today, activities funded with aid from foreign governments and international 
organisations are widespread and commonplace. They range from enormous, billion-dollar 
reconstruction projects in conflict zones in Iraq and Afghanistan to small-scale loans of 50 USD or less to 
women in Bangladesh and El Salvador. The objectives of aid, however, are varied and have changed over 
time along with the shifting priorities of the international community regarding the ultimate goals of 
‘development’ and the means of achieving them.6 Such a variation of the ends and the means inevitably 
exposes strengths in some areas and weaknesses in others. 
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF AID IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
International aid has been hugely beneficial to the lives of many, especially in cases of those living in 
continued conflict. By providing care and treatment for the wounded, as well as food supplies and 
sanitation, aid helps to alleviate the ‘silent forms of violence’ that are present in armed conflict, such as 
hunger, thirst and disease.7 It is argued by Nielsen et al. that reductions in aid significantly increase the 
probability of armed conflict commencing in vulnerable regions.8 Nielsen et al. provide an example of 
such an outcome with the argument that although there were many underlying causes, foreign aid did in 
fact play a direct role in the outbreak of violence in Mali in the 1990s.9 They argue that this is 
demonstrated by the state’s dependence on foreign aid (more than 30% of its budget for many years) 
after it was faced with desertification and severe droughts in the previous two decades, particularly 
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 S. Fukuda-Parr and J. Greenstein, 2010, “How should MDG implementation be measured: faster progress or meeting targets?” 
(working paper, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development Centre). 
7
 Perrin, “The impact of humanitarian aid”, 319-333. 
8
 Nielsen et al., “Foreign aid shocks”, 219-232. 
9
 Ibid. 
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affecting the Tuareg populations, who were heavily dependent on livestock.10 In the early 90s, however, 
when the flow of aid to Mali saw a severe reduction, they propose that the government was 
substantially weakened and no longer able to provide the same level of assistance to Tuareg groups at 
the time or into the future.11 Thus, with foreign aid previously keeping conflict at bay, this reduction in 
aid affected the power balance between the (the state and the Tuaregs), and facilitated the outbreak of 
violence. 
Continuing under this line of thinking, it could be said that aid indirectly decreases the likelihood of civil 
war. Collier and Hoeffler contend furthermore that aid has the potential to prevent the outbreak of civil 
war by stimulating economic growth, reducing the reliance on commodity exports, and increasing 
security through increased capacity of the government’s military and security forces.12 
The linkage of aid with domestic security has also found increasing popularity, particularly as a response 
to the September 11 attacks in the United States. This linkage is evidenced in Australia’s foreign aid 
goals,13 in which there is overwhelming emphasis put on linking national security with foreign aid and 
poverty reduction. There is a general consensus that it is sensible policy for states to offer preventative 
measures, through tied aid to fund counter-terrorism, specifically to countries where transnational 
terrorist organisations reside or have influence. Some find evidence that increased assistance does lead 
to a reduction of terror-related events originating from these countries.14 
However, reducing aid to a domestic security tool does not provide a comprehensive approach towards 
conflict management. The COIN (Counter-Insurgency) approach in Afghanistan provides a compelling 
example of such limitation; it would be difficult to argue that this approach has been effective at 
reducing conflict. A key reason for this is that aid, and the way it has been utilised in this case, falls short 
of addressing the main causes of insurgency, particularly in the most insecure regions of Afghanistan.15 
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 P. Collier and A Hoeffler, 2007, “Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Race?”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 69(1): 1-27. 
13
 “An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a Real Difference – Delivering Real Results”, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT), accessed 01/07/2014, http://aid.dfat.gov.au/publications/Pages/5621_9774_1073_3040_2380.aspx. 
14
 P. Lis, 2013, “Armed conflict, terrorism, and the allocation of foreign aid”, Economics of Peace and Security Journal 8(1): 12-
17. 
15
 E. Thompson, 2010, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN 
Operations”, in Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, 11-14. 
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This approach also works on several assumptions: that the key drivers of insecurity are poverty, 
unemployment, or radical Islam; and that economic development and ‘modernisation’ provide stability, 
particularly when complemented with aid projects that ‘win hearts and minds’ and help to legitimise the 
government.16 
It is important to recognise that there are always inherent dangers involved when making assumptions 
in any context. Of particular concern here is the assumption about ‘modernisation’, raising the question 
as to which vision of progress this represents. This assumption posits humanity as moving forward along 
a linear path, with some societies ahead and others behind, but with all attempting to achieve the same 
goal.17 In this way it is thought of as an unavoidable and irreversible progress than can be universally 
applied, as evidenced by an Australian Policy Document from 2011, ‘An Effective Aid Program for 
Australia: Making a Real Difference – Delivering Real Results’,18 which champions economic growth and 
free trade as key goals for development and modernisation. Economic growth is undoubtedly an 
important factor in poverty alleviation and conflict management, but it needs to be recognised that an 
approach that seemingly pushes the agenda of a neo-liberal free market system can also 
circumstantially be a contributing factor to poverty and thus conflict.19;20;21 An assumption that does not 
take this into account is in danger of appearing ethnocentric and very narrow in its scope, inevitably 
limiting its success in conflict management. 
While the above example provides a critique of the underlying reasons for providing aid, there are also 
other weaknesses that come about in the relationship between aid and conflict management. For 
instance, there is a danger that aid resources may be seen as a good ‘prize’ for rebels to capture, 
providing them with further incentive to instigate or continue conflict, thus arguably feeding 
instability.22 Furthermore, it is thought that foreign aid amplifies the government’s access to financial 
                                                          
16
 Thompson, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’”. 
17
 N. Hällström, 2013, “What is Development?”, What Next Forum. 
18
 Accessed 01/07/2014, <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/publications/Pages/5621_9774_1073_3040_2380.aspx>. 
19
 I. Ezeonu, 2008, “Crimes of Globalization: Health Care, HIV and the Poverty of Neoliberalism in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
International Journal of Social Inquiry 1(2): 113-134. 
20
 P. Kilby, 2007, “The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(1): 114-129. 
21
 J. E. Stiglitz, 2007, Making Globalization Work (W.W. Norton & Company).  
22
 J. De Ree and E. Nillesen, 2009, “Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan 
Africa”, Journal of Development Economics 88(2): 301-313. 
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capital, thus bringing about ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour by rebel groups (Ree and Nillesen, 2009).23 This 
argument proposes that the inflow of foreign aid can have a destabilising effect on current and pre-
existing tensions, and may in fact increase the risk of conflict. 
Thinking back to the failures of aid in Afghanistan, it could be argued that donor governments, in 
expecting aid to support peacebuilding processes in this region are, according to Goodhand, “expecting 
a child to do the job of an adult”.24 In other words, it is important to understand that aid alone is usually 
limited in its capacity to address the complex and varied dynamics of violent conflict and its underlying 
causes. It is also important to recognise that when weighed against the range of pressures and interests 
coming from international, national, and local actors, external aid is often quite weak.25 According to 
Uvin, this is in large part due to the fact that the impact of aid on the dynamics of conflict in recipient 
countries “takes place within the broader, often volatile environment of the relations between the 
country and the international community”.26 Essentially, not all forces and contributions to conflict can 
be addressed through foreign aid. 
Stopping all forms of aid to prevent any undesirable effects it may facilitate, however, would have even 
more disastrous consequences for the victims of conflict: no more food, no more medical care, and no 
more humanitarian presence that may be giving hope to those affected (Perrin, 1998).27 It is increasingly 
evident that to effectively manage or reduce conflict, it is necessary to combine aid with other 
approaches. A more comprehensive undertaking that makes it possible to reduce the negative effects of 
aid is one potential idea towards more effective conflict management. 
 
AID AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT (APD) 
As has been discussed, there are a variety of strengths and weaknesses in the ability of international aid 
to effectively manage conflict. This demonstrates that while aid cannot and should not be the sole 
                                                          
23
 De Ree and Nillesen, “Aiding violence or peace?”. 
24
 J. Goodhand, 2002, “Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan”, Third World Quarterly 
23(5): 840. 
25
 P. Uvin, 1999, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD). 
26
 Ibid, 4. 
27
 Perrin, “The impact of humanitarian aid”. 
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approach in the attempt to achieve peace, it may play an important role in facilitating a fragile peace,28 
and when combined with what the remainder of this paper will define as ‘progressive development’, it 
can be an effective tool in helping to manage conflict. 
It is widely acknowledged that poverty is a major (but not the sole) contributor to the likelihood of civil 
war and conflict in the developing world, with war also a major cause of poverty in the first place.29,30,31 
Thus, for aid to be truly effective in conflict management, it is important that it is partnered with a 
progressive form of development. Such a form of development should include a more holistic approach 
that increases the capacity of peacebuilding through humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation, and 
sustainable development.32 Linking aid with medium- and long-term development is also a key aspect of 
such an approach.  
Progressive ‘development’ is not limited to raising economic growth under a ‘western’ paradigm as 
discussed previously (page 3). Aid and progressive development (APD) should retain a focus upon 
improving the general economic and social climate in receiving countries, which would help to support 
measures to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state while aiding the emergence of an 
empowered civil society.33 This would mean that development aid should be directed at different levels, 
particularly the community level, including local government institutions and NGOs, while accounting for 
the overall context of the conflict.34 An APD approach can be most effective through working to support 
NGOs, community-based organisations, and local government, essentially working from the ground up, 
which would ideally help these institutions to become more capable and responsible to those whom 
they are created to benefit: the public.      
The inclusion of NGOs in this approach is important, as they can and do make significant contributions to 
conflict management. As pointed out by Aall:  
                                                          
28
 Goodhand, “Aiding violence or building peace?”. 
29
 S. Browne, ed., 2006, Aid and Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? (London: Routledge), 68. 
30
 J. Goodhand, 2001, “Violent conflict, poverty and chronic poverty”, Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 6. 
31
 P. Collier, 2007, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 18-21. 
32
 C. Bigdon and B. Korf, 2004, “The role of development aid in conflict transformation: Facilitating empowerment processes 






  11 
They can provide early warning of impending conflict, provide good offices, act as a mediator among groups 
in conflict, galvanise the international community into action, and mobilise vital resources for post-conflict 
societal reconstruction and reconciliation.
35
 
It is important to note, however, that NGOs are generally dependent upon the tolerance of their host 
country, meaning they lack political and military influence. In a rapidly deteriorating situation, this can 
leave them vulnerable and ineffective, and can potentially result in actions that may lead to further 
conflict rather than conflict management.36 There is also a need for the state and its institutions to be 
actively involved in the conflict management process, particularly in relation to security, justice, and job 
creation. 
An additional method to increasing the effectiveness of aid is to combine it with a multisectoral 
approach that strengthens the institutions of the state. An example of such an approach is evidenced in 
rapidly urbanising areas of Latin America and the United States.37 According to The World Bank, by 
addressing security, justice, and jobs in these areas, this approach has generated encouraging results, 
and: 
[Where] gang and drug-related violence have previously resisted ‘hard’ policing efforts, there has been over 
time a gradual shift toward multisectoral programs of prevention at the community level’.
38
 
Building trust between civil society and the military is also an important method in the management of 
conflict. This would inevitably need to entail a commitment by the military to improvements in 
accountability and human rights. However, without this, forces deployed into intensified operations may 
end up preying on civilians – as seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo – subsequently undermining 




                                                          
35




 The World Bank, 2011, “Transforming institutions to deliver security, justice, and jobs”, World Development Report 2011: 
Conflict, Security and Development, chapter 5. 
38
 Ibid, 148. 
39
 Ibid. 
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PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION – AID AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT (APD) IN SOMALIA 
According to the Global Peace Index, Somalia is placed 158th out of 162 countries, ranking it as one of 
the most conflict-ridden countries in the world (Global Peace Index). Descending into conflict following 
the collapse of the Siad Barre regime (1969-1991), which was overthrown by opposing clans, clan 
warfare ensued in Somalia with no government or parliament able to be agreed upon until as late as 
2004. More recently, there has been an Islamist insurgency led by Jihadi group ‘Al Shabab’, which, for a 
time, gained control over the southern part of the country, including the capital Mogadishu, leading to 
fighting between them and government forces with the help of foreign intervention. Eventually, Al 
Shabab was pushed out of the capital but to this day continues its attacks as ethic clashes increase. 
Although the paragraph above is merely a brief summary of recent conflict in Somalia, it nonetheless 
demonstrates that such a history of conflict in the country has facilitated a vast array of grievances and 
fragmentation of control. Given the history of the region, there is a danger that the involvement of 
external forces (foreign intervention) is likely to be associated with historical attacks on Islam and is 
linked with strongly entrenched social conservatism in many areas. Al Shabab has enacted a campaign of 
threats and alleged assassinations against any and all Somalis working for or thought to be collaborating 
with the UN and Western NGOs.40 In fact, there has been an increasing incidence of foreign workers 
killed or abducted in recent times.41,42 It is integral to the Somali context that horizontal inequalities are 
adequately addressed, for reducing such inequalities is paramount to eliminating a major source of 
conflict.43 Development that addresses this must include policies that are introduced cautiously, for – as 
demonstrated in Sri Lanka – any action to correct these inequalities can also provoke conflict by the 
group whose privileged position is being weakened.44 Thus, a ‘ground-up’ approach to conflict 
management that entails APD – one that takes into account the dangers and risks of foreign presence in 
the country – is of particular importance. 
                                                          
40
 K. Menkhaus, 2009, “Somalia: ‘They created a desert and called it peace (building)’”, Review of African Political Economy 
36(120), 223-233. 
41
 M. Ibrahim, 2009, March 17, “4 Aid Workers Abducted in Somalia”, The New York Times. 
42
 G. York, 2013, August 14, “MSF withdraws from Somalia, accuses government of complicity of attacks on aid workers”, The 
Globe and Mail. 
43
 F. Stewart, 2002, “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries”, BMJ: British Medical Journal (7333), 342-345. 
44
 Ibid. 
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Considering the fragility of the situation in Somalia, APD would need to allow for and strengthen the 
autonomy of local institutions, facilitating the inclusion of previously marginalised groups, while at the 
same time strengthening the effectiveness of the government. NGOs would play a key role in facilitating 
local clan dialogue, which would benefit from reconciliation efforts enacted by the government. 
Mediation efforts funded with international aid could be employed in an attempt to resolve conflicts 
and past grievances between clans, with the aim of bringing about alternative outlets for political 
expression than those currently used. Given such fragility, however, it is undoubtedly expected that the 
majority of these efforts would be faced with severe difficulties in their implementation. 
Considering that over 70% of Somalia’s population is under 30,45 opportunities for young people would 
need to be a central focus of an APD approach in Somalia. Particular importance should be placed upon 
the creation of viable education and employment opportunities in order to combat the 
disempowerment felt by many across all regions of the country as outlined in the ‘Somalia Human 
Development Report 2012’.46 This is all the more necessary, as the jihadist group Al Shabab is currently 
able to attract followers with its generous soldier salaries, which have been a key incentive for those 
facing economic hardship.47 International aid can play a key role in this approach by seeking to improve 
educational facilities, ensure adequate wages for educators, and provide start-up scholarships and 
grants for those facing particular hardships. However, aid funding needs to be carefully distributed; 
expenditure needs to be transparent and any claims of corruption thoroughly investigated. 
While advocating for certain measures to be enacted is one approach, actually implementing them into 
a conflict zone is another. An APD approach to conflict management should be open and adaptable to 
change. It needs to be acknowledged that this approach should not be seen as an attempt to find the 
silver bullet to managing conflict in Somalia; it should merely provide a potential framework with which 
to understand the potential for practical implementation into a conflict scenario. 
 
 
                                                          
45
 The World Bank, Data – Somalia, accessed 18 July 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia>. 
46
 United Nations, “Somalia Human Development Report 2012”, accessed 9 August 2014, 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/242/somalia_report_2012.pdf>. 
47
 J. C. Amble and A. Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014, “Jihadist Radicalization in East Africa: Two Case Studies”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 37(6): 523-540. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conflict will always exist and can even be a transformative process; however, it is how to deal with it 
and resolve it that is important. This paper has shown that while international aid has clear benefits and 
is relied upon by many in the developing world, it also suffers from certain drawbacks in relation to the 
management of conflict. Instead, this paper has suggested that aid be combined with other approaches 
to form an ‘Aid and Progressive Development’ (APD) approach that more effectively seeks to enable a 
holistic position to conflict management in the developing world, addressing horizontal inequalities, 
economic growth, security, and aiming to affect positive change at all levels. 
Using the example of the conflict in Somalia, this paper demonstrated the potential for implementation 
in a practical context and provided a framework for a path of aid and progressive development, 
including what such an approach would need to contain to be most effective. Although this also brought 
to light the realisation that actual implementation of this approach in a conflict with such longevity, 
fragmentation, and fragility would be an incredibly difficult undertaking, it nonetheless showed that 
when aid is combined with development, there is potential for effective conflict management. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
PRE-EMPTIVE CAPACITY 
by Sarah Jenkin-Hall 
 
Ghanaian diplomat and seventh Secretary-General to the United Nations, Kofi Annan, once professed, 
“It is the idea that the behaviour of states and the relations between them shall be governed by one law, 
equal and applicable to all”48. The formation of a permanent jurisdictional tribunal to prosecute 
perpetrators of human rights violations was essential to this overarching ideal of a central rule of law. 
Arraigning offenders of war crimes, genocide, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity, the 
Rome Statute-generated International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent jurisdictional body that 
governs international transgression49. Numerous structural and behavioural inadequacies minimise the 
credibility of the court as a source of managing conflict. The following discussion will include 
jurisdictional loopholes, patterns of prosecution, and relationships with other bodies governed by 
international law. To achieve further credibility, the ICC must adapt and encompass other approaches to 
conflict management shown to be practical in the developing world. A policy proposal will be put 
forward, positively developing the strengths of the ICC and improving upon shortcomings with 
application in two current conflicts. Through persuasive analysis, one can postulate that creative 
adaptions to the ICC in its current form will increase its authority as a method of controlling conflict and, 
more importantly, preventing it. 
 
FORMATION OF THE ICC 
A diplomatic conference held by the United Nations in July 1998 aimed to codify an already desired 
Statute for the creation of a permanent legal entity to prosecute pursuant to an overarching 
international rule of law50. Discrepancies about the judicial credibility of the proposed court were 
highlighted by the United States, which led other state parties in a discussion about the negative 
                                                          
48
 Kofi Annan, 1997, “International Criminal Court Promises Universal Justice, Secretary-General Tells International Bar 
Association”, United Nations Department of Public Information. 
49
 A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones, 2002, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a commentary, vol 2, 18. 
50
 Ibid. 
  19 
impacts to state-based sovereignty51,52. Both India and the United States proposed an amendment that 
limited prior consent requirements in situations involving “acts of officials or agents of a state in the 
course of official duties acknowledged by the state as such”. This resulted in acceptance based on 
agreement to the consensually selected method of jurisdiction53. 
Further developments since then resulted in the controversial prosecution of “crimes of aggression”54, 
adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010 by a consensus of ratifying parties under Article 
121.5. President of the World Federalist Movement Warren Allmand stated, “The capacity to prosecute 
aggression strengthens the ICC as an important instrument for international peace and security”55. The 
court will have jurisdiction for crimes of aggression after 1 January 2017 and for crimes committed one 
year after acceptance by 30 state parties of the previously mentioned amendments56. 
 
ANALYSIS: WEAKNESSES, IMPROVEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ICC creates a rules-based international system, which acts as a deterrent against the crimes 
pursuant to the Rome Statue provisions and the violation of basic human rights. The process provides 
for positive pressure in the international community at a significantly lower cost than other domestic 
alternatives57. While acknowledging that the ICC strengthens the global movement against violent 
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The Rome Statute – Article 124 
An overwhelming majority of states have accepted jurisdiction over genocide as a responsibility with 
automatic authority. However, key power holders such as Germany, France and the United States have 
withheld their support. Lengthy debate led to an agreement that states may ‘opt out’ of the ICC’s war 
crime jurisdiction for a seven-year period, whilst permanently agreeing to crimes against humanity and 
genocide58. This concept has attracted substantive criticism59. Interpretations have resulted in a 
consensus that states whose leaders are involved with or have the intention to commit war crimes are 
allowed to sign and ratify the Statute, yet ignore the jurisdiction where it is most convenient to their 
situation60. This loophole is widened further where offenders charged with war crimes also have the 
ability to be prosecuted under the Crimes against Humanity heading. The Rome Statute includes 
definitions for ‘torture’, ‘wilful killing’ and ‘murder’ under both headings61. If a state choses to opt out of 
jurisdiction of war crimes, the possibility exists that they may avoid prosecution of crimes against 
humanity62. 
The Rome Statute – Article 12 
Richard Dicker of the ICC Campaign of Human Rights Watch believes that the Rome Statute provides for 
individuals wanted for violation of human rights to travel freely without fear of prosecution63. This ‘lack 
of universality’ can also be described as ‘selective justice’. Other authors see the possibility that a breach 
of international law has occurred in the removal of a custodial state64. It should be noted that individual 
states have the power to try perpetrators of crimes outlined specifically in the Statute under 
international jurisdiction in domestic courts65. This concept has influenced the theory that the crimes 
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outlined by the ICC are so severe that they are indirectly crimes “against the entire world”; perpetrators 
should thus fear some form of prosecution no matter their international route66. 
Discriminatory Enforcement 
Defined by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta as a tool of Western imperialism, the ICC has been accused 
of prioritising the prosecution of leaders from weaker states over the global “elite”67. The eight 
significant cases considered by the ICC have been against African leaders, such as Kenyan Deputy 
President William Ruto68. An extension of judicial emphasis beyond African states is essential to the 
development of the ICC’s credibility. Those countries subject to ‘intensive analysis’, such as Colombia 
and Afghanistan, have not been dealt with as efficiently or effectively as those African nations in which 
the international community has witnessed swift prosecution69. In 2010, the UN High Commissioner 
(Human Rights) identified civilian attacks by the Revolutionary Armed Forces and United Self-defence 
Forces of Colombia as a war crime and crimes of aggression70. Further demonstrating this are charges of 
undue “collateral damage” and considered targeting of civilians by the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as 
the ‘warlord’ status of numerous Afghani government officials71. Despite the severity of these 
accusations, allegations have been deemed as ‘under analysis’ and ICC prosecutors have taken no 
further publically acknowledged action. 
Offender Prosecution Inconsistencies 
Using the principles of domestic analysis in Neoclassical Realism theory, attention should be directed to 
those in positions of power to attain court integrity72, providing deterrence to other states73. 
Legitimisation through their prosecution will create greater deterrence than singular cases against small-
scale criminals. The international community needs to find reassurance under the statutory protection 
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of the ICC, which they have developed with the aid of ‘persecution cases’ such as Charles Taylor’s 
involvement in the civil Sierra-Leone conflict74. 
Lack of Direction 
Clarity of the ICC’s future objectives in signatory countries is crucial in adapting to the current 
international political climate. This includes the strategies of particular prosecutors in the development 
of domestic judicial capacity and internal state structure75. This lack of facilitation of regional 
development is evident in the recent Ituri case between the pastoralist Hema and agronomist Lendu 
ethnic groups of the Democratic People’s Republic of the Congo76. Although suspects had been 
detained, no effort has been made to facilitate the stabilisation of the region’s government, showing a 
lack of strategic structural council and support77. The ICC should direct attention to those states that are 
yet to translate their rhetoric into visible support of the court’s formation. This has been evident in 
European states’ adoption of a ‘Western attitude’ of disinterest in Sudan’s defiance of the authority of 
the court78. 
Relations with the United Nations Security Council 
Despite a division of international opinion about the legitimacy and fairness of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), it is arguably one of the more influential political entities in evoking change and 
influence over conflict management79. The ICC is generally independent from the UN, unlike the similar 
institution, the International Court of Justice. There are, however, constraints of practical independence 
bestowed by the Rome Statute upon the UNSC, including limited judicial referral powers. Evident in 
Article 13 of the Statute, cases can be referred to the ICC by the UNSC in situations that lie outside of the 
court’s official jurisdiction80. The UNSC’s interest was sparked by both the violent response to the Libyan 
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Civil War by the Libyan Government in 2011 and also the 2005 recognition of the longstanding situation 
in Darfur81. These parties are not signatories to the Statute yet have had to accept judicial interference 
from the ICC. 
The relationship between the UNSC and the ICC aids in the expansion of a universal form of legal rule 
yet creates the risk of conflicting political interests between the entities. Article 16 gives the Security 
Council authority over the deferral of ICC investigations82. Although generally spanning twelve months, 
this period may be renewed indefinitely, depending on the current political concerns of the Council. 
Although this advantage increases the ICC’s ability to dabble in the enforcement capabilities of the 
UNSC, the risk of involvement with the political interest of the Council increases83. Critics of the Court 
argue that there are “insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and 
judges” and “insufficient protection against politicised prosecutions or other abuses”84. 
 
ADAPTION TO INCREASE PREVENTATIVE ABILITY 
The UN has a pre-existing avenue of peace development through the scope for regional settlement of 
disputes outlined in Article 33, Chapter VI of the UN Charter85. There lacks, however, an ability to 
improve specific regional environments through constitutionalism and integration of international and 
regional architecture. Additionally, international arbitration would provide a useful system of conflict 
management rather than simply prosecution. The ICC in its current capacity is far from an ideal body of 
international judicial authority. Developments and adaptions to the current system would not only 
increase its functionality as an approach to conflict management, but also advance its authority.  
Constitutionalism involves institutionalised power mechanisms controlled and developed to protect not 
only the interests of minority groups, but also the rights and liberties of the regional citizenry86. This 
method focuses on the development of state systems to strengthen government control of the 
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populace, stabilise the economic, political and social environment of the state and importantly, prevent 
further conflict through legitimacy of power87. Similarly, the ICC has the ability to improve regional and 
international architecture by developing regional organisation capabilities in dispute resolution88. 
Arbitration is also a viable option in which participating parties engage with personally or externally 
selected arbitrators. They often choose this over other options due to the arbitrator’s expertise, 
freedom to develop their personal procedures of arbitration, increased confidentiality and a relatively 
high degree of enforceability89. 
The ability to prevent and deter future violence resulting from both horizontal and vertical inequalities 
in a necessity. An institution that is home to many of the most advanced legal minds in international law 
should be utilised in a preventative manner. This advice should aid in advancing states that are driven to 
make positive, transformative changes to prevent future conflict. Seventh president of Ireland Mary 
Robinson once avowed, “The world needs lawyers more than [it] is willing to admit”90. This shift to 
proactivity could revolutionise the concept of an international rule of law. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The following proposal is that of a prototype. It is understood that the process of statue amendment 
may be met with resistance from various UN bodies, perceived as a further infringement on their 
already ‘compromised’ state sovereignty. It should also be noted that issues of funding and detailed 
implementation strategies are beyond what can be achieved in this short analysis. In an ideal world, this 
would be the recommended direction as advised from previous persuasive arguments. 
1: - Proposed removal of both Article 124 and Article 12 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, to increase 
deterrence of future crimes and a closing of the ‘opt-out’ jurisdictional loophole (discussed 
above). This will be done through the United Nations General Assembly and require a majority 
consensus. 
2: -  
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1. The ICC will create the following relevant organs under the guidance of the UN 
interpretation of the Rome Statute. The construction will: 
(a) allow for construction over an indefinite period of time* 
(b) be reviewed by the UNSC at 5 year intervals, taking into account feedback from 
states who have been privy to the legal services/aid 
(c)  It will do this in two capacities: 
(i) states have been negatively impacted upon by political, economic or 
civil unrest that has led to instability of state processes 
(ii) states can show evidence of instability that has the potential to lead to 
political, economic or civil unrest 
(d) It will supply aid through: 
(i) the provision of impartial legal advisors specialising in policy 
development and analysis, commercial legislative processes and 
international legal theory 
2. The ILAB will oversee an Arbitration Council (ILABAC) that will be of service when and 
only when states can show that they have: 
(a) been or are currently impacted upon by political, economic or civil unrest, or 
(b) been unsuccessful in previous attempts at conflict resolution, or 
(c) can demonstrate attempts at peaceful negotiation** 
3. The ILABAC will perform internationally recognised and accredited arbitration 
procedures, as agreed upon by such acts as the Australian International Arbitration Act 
(Cth) 1974 
4. States will have access to the services outlined in 2(b) and (4) if they: 
(a) are signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or 
(b) have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or 
(c) have made a compelling argument as to why the services are needed. This 
evidence-based argument is to be analysed by an executive branch of the ILAB in 
the determination of provision of services. 
* In the process of amendment, this time frame will be decided upon by a majority consensus by signatory states. 
** These attempts will be analysed by an executive branch of the ILAB in an impartial and fair capacity. 
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REAL WORLD APPLICATION 
Gaza-Israeli conflict 
The ongoing conflict involving southern Israel, Palestine and the Gaza Strip has resulted from the lack of 
certainty of land occupation, with further clashes between Palestinian militants and the Israel Defence 
Forces (IDF)91. The international community has condemned the Israeli infiltration, with Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon stating that the “suffering and death of civilians caught up in this conflict is 
intolerable”92. 
Currently, the actions of the ICC are severely limited in this conflict. Although specific perpetrators have 
been identified, the destruction is occurring on such a massive scale that prosecution of groups would 
not be legitimate or particularly constructive93. This would do nothing for the credibility or legitimacy of 
the court and its ability to manage conflict. 
Practical proposal 
The proposal has the ability to be implemented in the Gaza-Israeli conflict, as both Israel and Palestine 
have been part to the Rome Statue since December 2000 and January 2009 respectively94. Focus on the 
Gaza-Israeli issue would help to lessen accusations of discriminatory enforcement against African 
nations. The Middle East would be a good area to analyse in this capacity. This also differentiates from 
the Responsibility to Protect, as it encourages states themselves to seek help outside of their own 
borders95. 
The ILAB would determine who, under international law, has legal property rights to the territory* and 
the arbitration services outlined in sections (3) and (4) of the above proposition could aid in providing an 
avenue of debate and relatively peaceful negotiation based on legal opinion. Evidently, the ILAB would 
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look to aiding the redevelopment of the Palestinian state as the ICC investigates potential human rights 
violations. 
* It is understood that the history of this land division is not one to be treated lightly. The likelihood of this issue 
being resolved in the near future is unlikely. In a utopian situation, all parties would rely solely on the rule of law in 
settlement. 
Syria 
The ‘Syrian Uprising’ has been significant on the world stage since the nationwide upheaval against the 
reign of president Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian Government in 2011. Protests were met with violent 
resistance, providing a catalyst to armed rebellion stemming from relatively peaceful protesting96. Since 
that time, various militia and rebel groups have formed, the most notable being the Islamic Front and 
the Free Syrian Army97. This conflict is of great importance to the international community, not just for 
its violation of Article 13 but also the spill-out effect into surrounding states98. 
Practical proposal 
The proposal has the ability to be implemented in the Syrian Uprising, as Syria has been part to the 
Rome Statue since December 200099. 
Due to the sheer number of rebel groups present in the Syrian conflict, this proposal would work well 
under application. Arbitration may provide an enforceable avenue for groups to uncover the essence of 
their insurgence and, in lieu of this, highlight what specific change they desire. The ILAB would then 
have the capacity to work towards securing common desires outlined in arbitration, leaving the 
prosecution arm of the ICC to prosecute offending leaders. 
Rebel and militant groups who identify as active participants in the conflict, and can identify their 
motives, would nominate a spokesperson that would represent them within the new structure of the 
ICC. Any concerns arising from the arbitration process regarding government structure and policy would 
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be linked to the legal advisory body (ILAB) to increase credibility and positive action. The direction this 
would lead the conflict is uncertain, but it is predicted that governmental reform would be prioritised. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The policy recommendations outlined in this paper provide for a transformative approach to the ability 
of the ICC to improve its authority in a setting of significant global change through conflict prevention. 
The intention of the International Criminal Court is an honourable one: a united rule of law to govern, 
develop and deter the nature of conflict resolution. In its current capacity, however, the ICC is far from 
an ideal body of international judicial authority. Developments made to the current system will 
modernise conflict management and advance the authority of the court. The practicality of a new 
approach regarding the developing world will succeed if it is tailored to the multi-faceted, ongoing and 
historically rooted conflicts that occur here specifically. Variations on the pattern and future direction of 
prosecution and jurisdictional inconsistencies will improve the court. A transformative approach is 
required if the ICC is to remain a credible, influential and fully operational method of managing and 
preventing conflict in the developing corners of the world.  
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SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 
CONGO 
by Corinne Langman 
 
THE PREVALENCE AND NATURE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DRC 
Conflict in Eastern DRC has adduced more reports of war-related sexual violence than any other known 
conflict.100 Reliable estimates of sexual violence in the DRC do not exist,101 but it is conservatively 
estimated that there are 48 rapes every hour. Sexual violence in the DRC takes many forms, including 
rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, forced participation of family members to have 
sexual intercourse, rape in presence of spouses and children, and rape using objects such as knives or 
guns.102,103 Sexual violence has been so characteristically brutal that rape in the DRC has led to the 
creation of a new pathology – ‘rape with extreme violence’ – because of the coupling of penile rape and 
the violent destruction of genitalia and reproductive organs that is occurring. In addition to the 
unprecedented reports of genital mutilation, reports of gang rape have been exceptionally high. A 2011 
study indicated that 59.3% of rape victims had experienced gang rape, and the mean number of 
assailants per sexual attack is 2.5, with a range of 1 to 15.104 Another study suggested the average 
number of attackers per victim is 4.5.105 
A distinctive factor of sexual violence in the DRC is the number of women being assaulted in their 
homes. In most other conflicts, women are attacked outside the home; for example, in Darfur, 82% of 
sexual assaults occurred when women were outside their home villages.106 In the aforementioned 2011 
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DRC study, it was found that 56.5% of women were assaulted within their own homes, often while they 
were sleeping next to their family members.107 
Women do not appear to be more vulnerable to sexual violence based on demographic differences;108 
rather, it “affects young, old, single, married, divorced, and widowed women… [the] educated and the 
uneducated, as well as women of different occupations and different ethnicities”.109 Sexual violence in 
the DRC is therefore unprecedented, brutal and indiscriminate. 
 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF RAPE IN THE DRC 
Current and historical societal beliefs and practices 
There are a number of underlying social factors within the DRC that contribute to the high incidence of 
sexual violence.110 There are several customs, practices and commonly held beliefs that contribute to 
gender inequality and misogyny. Many of these beliefs centre on the morality of sexuality and marriage, 
and are exacerbated by harmful gender constructions.111 For example, rape is often understood only as 
sexual offences against women who are virgins.112 This contributes to the idea that non-virgins are 
already ‘defiled’, and the distinction between rape and consensual intercourse becomes blurry or 
inconsequential. An outcome of this belief is that society does not view early marriage as a negative 
endeavour, and forced sexual intercourse within marriage is not widely opposed (nor is it illegal).113 
Another commonly held belief is that male honour is “reflected in the chastity of his associated 
women”.114 When a woman is raped, while it is still viewed as harmful to the woman,115 it is largely 
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perceived as an offence against the family as a whole.116,117 Resultantly, rape in a non-war context is 
often repaired by the offender paying the family financial compensation, or by marrying the girl who 
was raped.118 Rape is, therefore, not seen as an offence against the individual woman, but an offence to 
the men around her and to the community. This idea could very well explain the overwhelming number 
of sexual violence cases in the Eastern DRC conflict; rape is being used as a tool not necessarily to harm 
individual people, but to bring dishonour and humiliation on families and communities as a whole. 
There are other widespread societal practices and beliefs that contribute to the dehumanisation of 
women in the DRC, and to flawed perceptions of consent and autonomy. There is an ongoing practice in 
the DRE called lévirat, which requires a widow to marry her husband’s brother.119 Given the social status 
of women and the complexities of providing for oneself as an older woman, this practice can be viewed 
positively in that the widow continues to be provided for. However, this practice perpetuates the notion 
that women are property of men. It also opens the door for ‘legal’ rape to occur in the new marriage. In 
addition to this, there is some level of belief in witchcraft in the DRC that fuels harmful practices, 
particularly my militia members. As an example, many Mayi-Mayi fighters believe that raping virgin girls, 
breast-feeding women or pregnant women will protect them.120 Other militia members in Katanga 
believed certain sexual body parts would protect them in war, and would cut off these body parts to 
wear around their necks in battle.121 Still other Rassemlement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) 
soldiers believed that raping pygmy women would cure certain ailments, such as back pain.122 
All of these beliefs, customs and practices contribute to a higher level of sexual violence both in non-war 
times and during war, as well as a widespread acceptance of violence against women. A 2010 study 
concluded that the high prevalence of gang rape, especially gang rape by non-military offenders, 
indicated the overarching tolerance of sexual violence towards women.123 This acceptance is also 
indicated by the soaring number of reports of intimate partner sexual violence (IPSV) in the DRC. A 2011 
study found that reports of IPSV were 1.8 times that of reports of rape in the region. The study also 
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demonstrated that 35% of women in the DRC reported having experienced IPSV, while neighbouring 
countries experienced far less: 12% in Rwanda, 13% in Malawi and 15% in Kenya.124 
It is clear that in the DRC, there is a tendency for women to be viewed as the property of men, there is a 
widespread acceptance of sexual violence towards women, and rape is seen as an offence committed 
against a community, not necessarily the individual woman. It is also clear that there exist a number of 
harmful customs that perpetuate the acceptance of sexual violence. Many of these factors existed pre-
conflict and thus were exacerbated when conflict occurred. “Violence against women does not originate 
with war and conflict; it emerges from prior social… and cultural discriminations that fuel sexual violence 
when a conflict erupts”.125 
The history and institutionalisation of gender inequality  
It is clear that gender inequality is rampant in the DRC, particularly within societal beliefs and practices. 
However, this gender inequality not only exists on a social level but has been institutionalised and 
legalised. According to the United Nations Gender Inequality Index (GII), the DRC is ranked 186 out of 
187 countries for gender inequality. The only country below the DRC is Niger.126 This index includes a 
variety of factors, including adolescent birth rate, seats in parliament, maternal mortality rate and 
population with secondary education. Women in the DRC are discriminated against through certain laws 
and customs, relating to everything from marriage, sexuality and personal autonomy.127 Family law in 
the DRC considers married women as minors for the purposes of the law in that their contractual, civil 
and work-related matters are all entirely subject to the agreement of their husbands.128 This law means 
that a woman’s assets belong to her husband. Widows are also not entitled to inheritance.129 
Some DRC laws reference gender equality and have attempted to curtail certain practices. For example, 
the Congolese constitution mentions that all Congolese citizens are equal before the law130, and that 
public authorities are to ensure the elimination of discrimination against and violence towards 
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women.131 A law was recently instituted that banned “transactional penalties”,132 such as the 
aforementioned notion of paying financial compensation as punishment for rape. Despite the intentions 
of these laws, the effects have not been fruitful. Transactional penalties are still common, and sexual 
violence on an institutional level continues. 
Institutionalised sexual violence has a strong history in the DRC. Military officials in the Mobutu 
Government committed sexual violence; the army and police in particular committed sexual violence 
against the female relatives and wives of the political opposition.133 This in and of itself demonstrates 
that rape as a form of punishment of the opposition has deep historical roots within the country, which 
has influenced the current trend of raping women to destroy a community. Prison guards also forced 
female inmates to perform sexual service in order to attain basic needs.134 As Kabila’s army advanced in 
1997, both sides raped and abducted women. As time continued, all tribal, national and regional parties 
committed sexual violence against women.135 As a very simple statement, sexual violence was the 
foundation of taunting the opposition and gaining power; this foundation has therefore been the modus 
operandi for all continuing conflict. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF PEACEBUILDING 
by Kristian Le Gallou 
 
With the increase in the number of intrastate conflicts following the end of the cold war and the daily 
stream of media coverage broadcasting violence and unrest, peace in countries experiencing long-term 
or recurring conflict can seem unattainable. Paul Collier goes as far as to suggest that peace in states 
emerging from civil war has only a fifty percent chance of lasting a decade.136 Despite the complexities 
of conflict, and especially civil war, there exists a range of mechanisms that look to aid the resolution of 
conflict and attempt to construct a lasting peace. Peacebuilding is one such method, and is the focus of 
this essay. After defining the term, some of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to secure 
peace post-civil war will be discussed in order to show that, whilst imperfect, peacebuilding is necessary. 
Following this, it will be shown how peacebuilding can be combined with other conflict management 
techniques to make it more effective. Finally, this previous discussion will then be applied to the context 
of the Central African Republic to explore how peacebuilding could be implemented in order to secure a 
sustainable peace. 
Peacebuilding has a somewhat elusive and fluid definition; it is dependent on who is defining it and their 
political purposes. It has also become somewhat integrated and associated with other practices, 
including peacekeeping, peacemaking and state-building, meaning a narrow definition is difficult to 
establish.137 However, there are general definitions that capture the overall idea behind peacebuilding 
and what it seeks to achieve. Gareth Evans understands peacebuilding to be a “long-term preventative 
strategy” that looks to address causes of insecurity.138 Along the same vein, the United Nations’ (UN) 
definition has evolved and consists of targeted measures that strengthen national capacities to manage 
conflict at all levels in order to reduce the risk of countries falling into or re-entering conflict, creating 
the foundations for sustainable peace and development.139 What this looks like in practice is unique to 
each conflict, but the common aims are to provide assistance involving “military, security, socio-
economic development, humanitarian relief, elections and human rights protection” that compliment 
and work towards the construction or reconstruction of “physical, political, governance, economic and 
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development infrastructures and institutions”.140 Therefore, peacebuilding is not only about providing 
military and physical security to reduce and avert violence but also transforming structures and 
relationships at all levels of society to strengthen that society.141 
Timing is a crucial issue when discussing peacebuilding; it is not a short-term goal. The two years 
following the end of the main conflict in a country is seen as the vital window to begin the 
implementation of peacebuilding activities; it is when peace is tenuous and needs are often greatest.142 
Moreover, this two-year post-conflict window is also the greatest opportunity to set in motion effective 
and long-term processes that, if successful, significantly increase the chance for a lasting peace.143 
 
STRENGTHS 
Whilst critics attack peacebuilding as neo-imperialist or colonialist, it can be widely agreed that, whilst 
peacebuilding missions are not strictly altruistic (the strategic interests, foreign security and economic 
priorities of international actors can come into play), there is genuine desire to create a peace that 
allows the redevelopment of a sustainable state.144 However, intent is not enough to give validity to 
peacebuilding alone. 
Civil war is a fundamentally complex situation, caused by myriad factors. However, despite this 
complexity, peacebuilding looks to wade into the issues and redress them in order to sustain peace. This 
is the major strength of peacebuilding: it looks to the root causes of conflict and ways in which they can 
be addressed and resolved. But what are these root causes? Paul Collier looks to economic factors to 
explain the onset of civil war: low income, slow economic growth and the relationship this often has 
with the weakness of the state.145 Karen Ballentine, however, acknowledges that economic factors are 
not the sole cause of civil war, but that a complex mix of economic, political, ethnic and security 
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dynamics exists.146 Another hypothesis is the idea of inequality (economic, social, political and cultural) 
between identity groups as the cause of conflict, known as horizontal inequalities.147 Regardless of one’s 
academic persuasion to the cause of civil war, peacebuilding broadly caters for these many factors. 
Policies and activities that focus on enhancing equitable “economic development and distributive 
justice, encourage rule of law, protect fundamental human rights, and foster growth of democratic 
institutions” are mutually reinforcing and make contributions to security.148 Peacebuilding does not just 
focus on one area; it looks at a wide range of reforms to strengthen the state to better represent and 
serve its citizens. 
Who is involved in peacebuilding activities is also a key element of the process. First and foremost is the 
importance of national actors; any peacebuilding program needs to be primarily owned by national 
actors, or it loses much of its effectiveness and legitimacy.149 National ownership, through engaging with 
local and traditional authorities as well as minorities, is the only way to ensure meeting the short- and 
long-term goals in a sustainable way and create a broad base of support.150 Secondly, the international 
community also has a role to play, which is frequently requested, as the tasks facing national actors 
following conflict is immense and requires large-scale coordination, investment of funds and 
expertise.151 However, as will be shown later, the diversity of actors involved can also be detrimental to 
peacebuilding and can weaken its effects. 
The diverse and integrative approach of peacebuilding is also strengthened by the commitment by the 
United Nations to continue learning lessons from previous missions and work towards greater 
processes.152 The acknowledgement that there is no universal template for peacebuilding and to 
continually build upon experience whilst also “maintaining flexibility and adaptability” to be able to 
respond to the “fluid and complex situations” of post-conflict situations highlights the positive and 
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evolving nature of peacebuilding.153 Naturally, there have been steep learning curves in the history of 
peacebuilding, and there is a certain disparity between the ideal and reality. As Roland Paris argues, 
there appears to be no real alternative to peacebuilding. That does not mean, though, that it cannot 
undergo constant scrutiny and reform to improve practices.154 
 
WEAKNESSES 
Unsurprisingly, peacebuilding is not the silver bullet that will guarantee the avoidance of future conflict. 
Similarly to all approaches to conflict management, there are weaknesses within peacebuilding that can 
impact on its success. 
A large and complex operation such as peacebuilding requires a strong degree of coordination. 
However, the lack of coordination between national or international actors can be a common problem. 
At the national level, issues found within transitional power-sharing arrangements, weak 
communications systems, a politicised civil society and media and a weak civil service make it difficult 
for governments to coordinate the international response.155 At the international level, the wide range 
of actors involved (the UN, international financial institutions, regional states, bilateral donors, non-
government organisations) can create challenges in uniting behind a common strategy for peacebuilding 
and effectively dividing the roles and responsibilities.156 The inability to resolve coordination between 
actors can derail a peacebuilding operation and hide the negative effects that the intervention may have 
in reinvigorating or exacerbating conflict and violence.157  
As has been discussed, national and local ownership of the peacebuilding process is important, and a 
lack of it can severely weaken operations. David Francis emphasises the questions of legitimacy that can 
plague post-conflict governments if they are not permitted or empowered by external actors to “win the 
hearts and minds” of the local populace to support reconstruction and redevelop a common national 
identity.158 The actions of international actors – often characterised by altering levels of cooperation, 
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consensus and occasionally coercion – can create a “phantom state” that is accountable to international 
agents instead rebuilding the state accountable to the locals.159,160 This in turn erodes the confidence of 
the citizens in the state. A lack of ownership is therefore strongly linked with the lack of consultation of 
locals, understanding of needs and an uncoordinated strategy by external actors, all of which can 
severely undermine the peacebuilding process.161 
As previously mentioned, timing is a key component of peacebuilding; poor timing can derail the entire 
process. For example, holding elections at the right time is vital. When it is appropriate to hold elections 
is different for each situation, but the United Nations identifies that elections can create tensions and 
renew conflict if “inadequate attention is paid to technical constraints, the need to strengthen and 
nurture nascent political processes and community participation and civil society is ignored”.162 Post-
election violence was seen in countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Guinea, threatening a return to 
civil war.163 The importance of timing, therefore, is inextricably dependent on the unity of international 
actors and avoiding fragmented approaches when working with national actors to secure hard fought 
gains, based on an understanding of the needs and dynamics of the population.164 
 
SUPPORTING APPROACHES 
It is evident that peacebuilding can be favourably coupled with other conflict management techniques 
to enhance its capacity. Already, there is a blurred distinction and often overlapping goals between the 
approaches such as peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, but there are other approaches that 
can also be combined with peacebuilding.165 
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Firstly, for peacebuilding to be implemented successfully, there needs to be “a basic level of political 
will, commitment and consensus among the main national protagonists”.166 A robust mediation process 
preceding the implementation of peacebuilding activities is one way that peacebuilding can be 
enhanced. Mediation, a process of negotiation led by an external third party that looks to facilitate a 
solution, is inherently valuable to facilitating peacebuilding. Virginia Fortna’s research found that peace 
is more difficult to maintain when no decisive victory is achieved, leaving both sides fully capable of 
reigniting hostilities and neither side completely satisfied with the outcome.167 The inability to secure a 
peace agreement between warring parties or outline an agenda to address the causes of the conflict 
seriously diminishes the potential of peacebuilding measures, to the extent of rendering any action 
ineffectual.168 Therefore, mediation can be used as the tool to secure consensus and take steps toward 
the construction of a lasting peace. 
Secondly, comparatively to interstate wars, intrastate conflict bitterly divides societies, creating 
immense challenges to sustaining peace.169 Consequently, another complimentary method of post-
conflict management to enhance peacebuilding is the implementation of an inclusive reconciliation 
process. Peacebuilding has been criticised for its focus on state reconstruction and bringing justice 
rather than looking to consolidate peace.170 Reconciliation is therefore vital, as whilst there may be 
political peace following conflict, social peace is not guaranteed.171 The road to reconciliation is neither 
short nor easy. It does not mean forgetting the past; rather, there is the need to understand what has 
taken place while at the same time undergoing reform to improve the daily lives of citizens, so they are 
not subjected to the same conditions under which they suffered grievously.172 To reconcile a society 
requires the active participation of all sides of the conflict and for there to be some degree of truth, 
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forgiveness and justice.173 It is then that the journey towards realising a shared future can take place and 
dilute the fermentation of hatred and the desire for revenge.174  
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Peacebuilding is not just an academic concept but one that is actively applied throughout the world. The 
Central African Republic (CAR) is one such country in which peacebuilding will have a role to play when 
conflict ends. 
To understand why and how peacebuilding will be needed, it is important to understand the conflict 
that is currently taking place in the CAR, and the recent history that has played into the crisis. With the 
overthrow of the government in March of 2013 by the predominantly Muslim ‘Seleka’ coalition, 
retaliatory violence erupted between the Seleka and the largely Christian ‘anti-Balaka’ fighters. What 
has now emerged is a largely religious conflict pitting Muslims and Christians against each other, which 
has displaced 600,000 people, created food insecurity for 1.7 million and left 878,000 needing 
immediate medical attention.175 As always, however, there are underlying issues that highlight where 
peacebuilding will be needed.  
The CAR has been described not only as a failed state, but a phantom state with a limited institutional 
capacity for nearly half a century.176 Governance has been the major issue, with prevalent and incessant 
looting of state resources and control of illicit economic networks by successive governments and 
national actors predominantly creating cause for conflict.177 This corruption has led to an economic 
collapse that has seen the near complete disappearance of the formal economy and reliance on non-
governmental organisations and churches to provide social services.178 Responses to previous crises 
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have followed the lines of military presence, humanitarian aid and budgetary support, but it is clear that 
this will not be enough to break the cycle of violence.179 
In September 2014, an 11,800-strong peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) will be deployed to the CAR in an 
effort to stabilise the country.180 It is at this time that there is great potential to implement an inclusive 
peacebuilding agenda if the violence can be controlled and immediate humanitarian needs can begin to 
be met. The following recommendations are only a brief snapshot of the work that needs to be done in 
the CAR and only scratch the surface of what will be a lengthy process towards peace and 
reconstruction. As with all peacebuilding operations, timing and sequencing are major issues, with many 
demands needing to be met at once.181 Hence, there will be no suggestions of timing, merely 
highlighting of some of the processes that need to take place. 
The economy is a vital aspect of any recovery process for the CAR and will help to legitimise the 
transitional government. It is also an area wherein actions must be balanced. The transitional 
government must work alongside international donors in order to create jobs – an important aspect of 
the process not only for the general population but also for those involved in direct military combat.182 
The need to rebuild infrastructure and revitalise agriculture is an area that can work in tandem with a 
gradual process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, giving people the means to support 
themselves. Another economic aspect important for stabilisation is the recovery of natural resource 
sites (gold and diamonds) throughout the country as well as combatting illegal economic networks. This 
process could initially be facilitated and enacted by part of the peacekeeping delegation (to provide 
security and administration) and be source to help fund reconstruction projects.183 
As a major source of grievance, economic management in the CAR needs serious reform to avoid repeat 
conflict. Whilst being mindful of the need to empower nationals, international technical assistance can 
be provided at this stage to undergo reform of the taxation and financial monitoring systems and 
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strengthen checks and balances.184 There is also opportunity to provide training to civil servants in both 
the administration and finance sectors to help fight the history of corruption. 
Finally, it is important to strengthen an impartial judicial system, not only in the capital of Bangui but 
also in other major towns. The International Crisis Group notes that the UNDP and EU are already 
working towards this, but notes that further technical assistance is required by the CAR Government for 
there to be a “reconstituted police force, prosecution service and judiciary”.185 The need for justice, 
however, will need to be balanced with the need for reconciliation. As a country that has been deeply 
divided by a conflict polarising Christians and Muslims, it is vital that a comprehensive reconciliation 
process take place in order to allow the country to operate once again and avoid the recurrence of 
violence. It is here that the example of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda could prove beneficial for the CAR, 




Attempting to avert the relapse of violence and to foster conditions that facilitate the transformation of 
the state and society to make a long-term peaceful transition possible is highly commendable. 
Peacebuilding’s strategic outlook – which is to direct efforts in confronting the root causes of conflict 
and to honour the importance of national ownership whilst still providing adequate long-term 
international support – lends it great strength as a method of conflict management. Granted, there are 
issues associated with peacebuilding that can easily destroy a fragile peace and relaunch the country 
into conflict. Once the costs and benefits are weighed up, however, it becomes evident that whilst 
“peacebuilding is tremendously complex and prone to unanticipated consequences”, it is “also too 
important to lose or abandon”.186 This is what has been argued in the Central African Republic case 
study. The international community can intervene and attempt to end the violence, but simply 
maintaining security whilst leaving the country with the structural problems that have plagued it for 
decades will only mean yet another return to conflict later on. Therefore, whilst peacebuilding is not 
perfect, it is necessary.  
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA 
by Megan Lowe 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Success cannot merely be measured quantitatively. The success of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) cannot be measured by the total number of cases (75), nor the total number of 
convictions (52).187 Rather, indicia of the success of the ICTR can be gleaned from analysis spanning 
multiple disciplines, particularly anthropology, psychology, law and politics. Few would disagree that 
securing the convictions of heads of state,188 leaders of media,189 and the apparent ‘mastermind’ of the 
entire genocide190 has significantly contributed to retributive justice. Further, the landmark case of 
Prosecutor v Akayesu
191
 broke international normative ground in its dealing with sexual violence, 
assisting in constructing a clearer narrative of the genocide. Regardless, flaws such as geographical 
dispersal, susceptibility to political manipulation, questions of legitimacy and lack of local ownership 
have significantly detracted from both the retributive and restorative qualities of the Tribunal. When 
considering alternatives, however, including the Gacaca courts, a Hybrid Court (as per the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone), or a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (as seen in South Africa), due credence must 
be paid to the idiosyncratic conditions that distinguish the various cases, and ask the question: was the 
ICTR the best response to the worst conditions? 
 
THE ICTR: ITS SUCCESSES 
A similar sentiment to that of the International Criminal Court can be shared with the ICTR: its mere 
existence is in many ways an achievement in itself. That, however, does not equate to a successful post-
justice mechanism, but rather a feat of international cooperation. Regardless, the ICTR has been 
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successful in holding the chief leaders of the Genocide accountable.192 In prosecuting only such high 
level persons, this prosecutorial practice emphasises an appreciation of the need for reintegration and 
reconciliation of low-level genocidaires (handled by the Gacaca courts), whilst appreciating that 
genocide “is one of those human rights violations that simply demands prosecution”.193 Such landmark 
cases as those that are heard before the ICTR have likewise assisted with prosecution in the Rwandan 
domestic courts by interpreting and applying the abstract crime of genocide to individual criminal 
responsibility,194 and by finding that sexual violence could constitute a crime against humanity or even 
genocide.195 Likewise, establishing that the Tutsi were a distinct ethnic group (and therefore that the 
crime of Genocide was applicable) was not as straightforward as one would expect because they shared 
a language, religion and culture with the Hutu.196 In finding this in the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu,197 
the ICTR contributed to the narrative that would assist in discrediting those ‘genocide deniers’ and 
undermine a resurgence of Hutu racial extremism. The principle of individual criminal responsibility 
clearly attributes blame to individuals rather than ethnic groups generally, further undermining ethnic 
divides. Similarly, the case of Kambanda v Prosecutor198 was a direct blow to “state-actor impunity by 
convicting the Prime Minister of genocide and sentencing him to life imprisonment”. Finally, the “Media 
Case”199 found radio presenters and newspaper journalists guilty of inciting genocide. There is no doubt 
that such key convictions assisted the process of achieving justice in the aftermath of the genocide. 
Further, the ICTR had powers far exceeding that of the domestic courts, via rules such as Rule 40bis, 
which enables the Prosecutor to demand that a suspect be transferred to Arusha, regardless of their 
current location.200 This power arises solely from the fact that the ICTR was created by a series of 
Security Council Resolutions that are binding upon all states. It is highly unlikely that Rwanda would 
have ever received such cooperation from neighbouring states such as Kenya or the DRC, who were 
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largely sympathetic to the genocidaires. This power was expressly used with regard to Kenya in 1997 
and resulted in Kambanda’s arrest.201 More generally, Security Council Resolution 955 predicated 
complete cooperation with the ICTR.  
Although unfortunately not of any direct benefit to the Rwandan people, perhaps the greatest legacy of 
the ICTR is the contribution to international criminal jurisprudence it made:202 a sort of ‘best practices 
guidelines’ for the next time that “never again became wherever again”.203  
Cultural Relativism and the ICTR 
The ICTR correctly adopted a mild cultural relativist approach in its dealing with war crimes. 
Acknowledging that “our judicial systems, with their peculiar rights and remedies, are products and 
reflections of our unique political and cultural notions”,204 the ICTR considered cultural differences when 
evaluating witness testimony and considering sentencing practices, amongst other things. One particular 
issue, as noted in Prosecutor v Akayesu, was that “syntax and everyday modes of expression in the 
Kinyarwanda language are complex and difficult to translate”.205 Broader cultural considerations were 
also relevant, such as the tendency in Rwandan culture to avoid answering questions straightforwardly if 
the answer is a sensitive one.206 Therefore, judges “did not draw any adverse conclusions regarding the 
credibility of witnesses based on this”.207 Thus, although hybrid courts such as the SCSL may have been 
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Domestic Judicial Reforms 
It is suggested that the establishment of the ICTR encouraged domestic judicial reform to some 
extent.209 For example, a Dutch-funded prison was constructed in 2004, with the government 
attempting to ensure it complies with international standards.210  Similarly, the death penalty was 
abolished in 2007, and in 2008 they acceded to the UN Convention Against Torture. Perhaps most 
importantly, 2009 legislative amendments mean that a witness can no longer be charged with genocide 
ideology, or be threatened or punished for in-court testimony given.211 Whilst these changes are 
undoubtedly improvements, they have unfortunately not yet been sufficient to improve local 
confidence in the judicial system.212 
 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ICTR 
Geographical Dispersal 
When the ICTR was initially set up, it was linked to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. As such, it shared the same Chief Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber, both of which were 
based in The Hague. Similarly, in the interests of ensuring independence, the location of the tribunal was 
chosen to be Arusha, Tanzania. It is therefore unsurprising that such dispersal “[encumbered] the 
activities of the Tribunal for Rwanda and [complicated] communication and coordination between the 
different offices and organs”.213 This has significantly reduced both the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the institution in terms of local involvement: 
The main sentiment in Rwanda regarding the ICTR may well be massive ignorance: ordinary people know 
or understand next to nothing about the tribunal’s work, proceedings, or results.
214 
Although these complications arose, and although Rwanda was undoubtedly not happy with the 
Tribunal being in Arusha, the need for expediency in its establishment– in tandem with the chaos and 
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vast lack of infrastructure in Kigali at the time – meant that it was simply impractical for the Tribunal to 
be based in Rwanda. Further, there have since been consistent attempts by the RPF to control the 
Tribunal, and as such its concerns about remaining independent appear well founded.215 It is therefore 
unclear if a more appropriate alternative existed.  
Victor’s Justice? 
It is clear that the political climate that prefaced the establishment of the ICTR is an extremely fragile 
one,216 thought to be “largely at the mercy of the international actors that created it”.217 However, by far 
the larger issue is the way in which it can be manipulated by Kagame and the current government in 
order to avoid liability for RPF committed crimes. Although the crimes were on a much smaller scale 
than those committed by the RGF and the Interahamwe, it is widely accepted that the RPF committed 
crimes on a systematic and sustained level.218,219,220 However, the Tribunal simply cannot function 
without the support of the government, which leaves it extremely vulnerable. This is highlighted very 
clearly by the events that followed then-Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s announcement of her 
intentions to prosecute RPF crimes. The government then ceased to cooperate with the ICTR, launching 
a campaign to have her removed, which ultimately proved successful.221 Highlighting just how 
dependent the ICTR is upon the government, Kagame then issued a travel ban, preventing witnesses 
from testifying in Arusha222 and essentially blackmailing the ICTR into ceasing investigations into RPF 
crimes. It is additionally acknowledged that prosecuting members of the current government, such as 
Kagame, would cause significant instability in the region.223 This failure to prosecute, however, has 
significantly reduced the legitimacy of the institution, particularly in light of continued International 
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Humanitarian Law abuses by the RPF in the Democratic Republic of Congo.224 Further, it opens the door 
to revisionism, enabling Kagame and the RPF to effectively change history, reinforcing their control over 
Rwanda.225 
One way the ICTR has attempted to overcome this significant dilemma is by deferring investigations of 
RPF crimes to domestic prosecution,226 but this has merely reinforced the ‘victor’s justice’ complex. Only 
32 RPF fighters have been prosecuted, representing no more than 100 deaths227 out of the estimated 
35,000 that were the responsibility of the RPF.228  In what was essentially the test case for deferral to 
the Rwandan Military Courts, it is widely thought that the case was a sham trial that ignored crucial 
evidence in order for senior RPF officials to avoid responsibility.229 In the case, both officials were 
acquitted whilst the common soldiers were convicted of the murders of over ten people, yet only 
sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment each.230 Crucial witnesses for the prosecution were never called, 
and the prosecution merely supported the defence’s version of the case. For example, the prosecution 
agreed that the clergy asked to be moved to a new location away from international scrutiny, ignoring 
the evidence that the RPF intentionally moved them to such a location with the intent of killing them.231 
Regardless of all this, the ICTR review claimed that it was a fair and competent trial. 
Generally speaking, such ‘victor’s justice’ can easily lead to renewed cycles of violence “by implicitly 
permitting unlawful acts and by creating an atmosphere of distrust and revenge”.232 Although this is a 
significant shortcoming of the ICTR, it is understandable that there were limited alternatives, given the 
political climate at the time. 
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Local Ownership and the ICTR 
Local ownership is often highlighted as an important element of restorative justice, and in increasing the 
legitimacy of institutions.233 Although less widely acknowledged, local ownership can also play an 
important role in retributive justice if members of the community can see perpetrators being punished. 
Important to striking a balance between “vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of 
wrongs”234 is the involvement of communities to ensure that the best approach to transitional justice is 
taken. The ICTR, however, had virtually no local participation.235 Although a symbol of local ownership is 
the Rwandan Government’s involvement in drafting the Security Council resolution, the government 
had a number of failings in terms of representative qualities such as coming off of the back of a war and 
being unelected.236 Therefore, whilst more direct local ownership would have been ideal, the question 
remains: was greater local ownership possible at the time of the establishment of the ICTR? Given the 
need for rapid establishment of the Tribunal,237 it is understandable that local community consultations 
were not carried out. Additionally, funding from international stakeholders can be impacted by local 
ownership. However, the ICTR was less susceptible to this than the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which 
relied entirely on voluntary funding.238 Regardless, this was relevant in discussions as to whether the 
death penalty should be allowed.239  If there were greater local ownership, a stronger consensus in 
favour of the death penalty would have made it difficult for the Security Council to deny it, though it 
could very well have affected international support for the ICTR. 
There are a number of ways the absence of local ownership reduced the Tribunal’s restorative abilities. 
Whilst it may be logical to believe that “guilty pleas, combined with expressions of remorse, contribute 
to reconciliation,”240 there was more the ICTR could have done for restorative justice. The vast majority 
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of Rwandans knew little about the ICTR or its work, and although an outreach programme was 
eventually introduced, it was not until years later.241 If there were greater local ownership from the 
beginning, the population would have been less swayed by negative publicity.242 Regardless, those who 
were aware of the work of the tribunal were still dissatisfied with certain aspects of it, including the 
absence of compensation,243 absence of the death penalty,244 and emphasis on defendants’ rights at the 
expense of victims.245 Broader consultations with the community, as opposed to merely the 
government, would have highlighted just how pressing these issues were for the population. Further 
issues that damage the perceived legitimacy of the ICTR in the eyes of the population include the 
perception that its high burden of proof results in rough handling of victims of sexual violence, and the 
‘Arusha Hilton’ detention facilities.246 These factors combined marginalise the relevance of the ICTR to 
the people, diminishing its contributions to the process of reconciliation that it could make. Thus, 
although these issues seem logical for Western notions of justice, the full restorative impact of the ICTR 
was nonetheless diminished. 
 
COMPARISONS WITH OTHER POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘SATRC’) 
Many different South African stakeholders advocate for the SATRC for various reasons. Very much in line 
with the idea that “without a minimal peace, no other values can exist”,247 its pragmatic realism grants 
amnesty in exchange for full disclosure. From a healing perspective, it emphasises the importance of 
victims reliving the past and having the opportunity to speak out about their suffering. This is in stark 
contrast to legal proceedings, which “[chop] the stories into digestible parts… and [sort] and [refine] 
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them to create a new narrative”.248 This respects the dignity of the victims, which is a concern that many 
have highlighted with the ICTR. There are, however, issues that suggest a TRC may not have been 
effective in Rwanda like it was in South Africa. For example, some suggest that the significance of 
Mandela as a moral and political leader cannot be underestimated.249 This is in contrast to Kagame and 
the atrocities that the RPF committed under his leadership. Additionally, some feel that genocide – in 
contrast to apartheid – simply makes reconciliation unthinkable.250 Finally, in South Africa religion was 
considered integral to the TRC. In Rwanda, religion was intertwined with the state, and religious leaders 
were widely identified as inciting and perpetrating acts of genocide.251 This, for obvious reasons, actively 
discredited religion as a tool to encourage reconciliation. Thus, although TRCs offer clear benefits to 
criminal tribunals, it is unlikely that a mechanism similar to that in South Africa would have succeeded in 
the Rwandan context. 
The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR 
In contrast to the ICTR, the Gacaca courts are acknowledged to place a greater emphasis on restorative 
justice.252 Gacaca encourages confessions by allowing sentence reductions for those who confess,253 
assisting in building an accurate narrative and providing a basis for reconciliation.  Further, in contrast to 
the ICTR, where trials cost roughly $25 million each and take a considerable length of time, the Gacaca 
courts are expedient and cost effective. In addition, reducing sentences reduces both the financial 
burden and the social drain of prison populations by reintegrating individuals into society more 
rapidly.254 Sociologically speaking, the criminals dealt with by the Gacaca are not social deviants, but 
rather remorseful individuals who want to be forgiven and accepted back into society.255 Finally, in 
contrast to the common conceptions Rwandan’s have about the ICTR, the population is comfortable 
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with the Gacaca. Reconciliation is taught in schools in an attempt to prevent hatred from being passed 
from generation to generation.256 
There are, however, flaws in the operation of the Gacaca, with it being considered “popular 
punishment”.257 Although the absence of lawyers in the proceedings is more cost effective, it means that 
rights to due process are virtually non-existent.258 Further, it is easy for individuals to flee justice, as the 
courts do not have the same Security Council mandate as the ICTR. There have been serious questions 
raised as to the courts’ legitimacy after a number of individuals appointed as ‘Inyangamugayo’ (Gacaca 
judges) were later recognised as genocidaires, and the extremely basic legal training that such judges 
have.259 Additionally, the Gacaca are even more vulnerable to governmental interference, with Kagame 
accused of bringing false charges against political opponents for his own interests.260 Although the 
Gacaca have handled more than 1 million cases (compared to the ICTR’s 75), it is evident that neither 
the ICTR nor the Gacaca is clearly superior to the other. In fact, it may well be argued that the ICTR, 
regardless of its flaws, serves a purpose in prosecuting the top tier of perpetrators, who would not be 
reintegrated into society regardless.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Two concluding remarks are immediately evident: it is important that the perpetrators of the genocide 
be held to account, and the ICTR is not without its flaws. What is less clear, however, is how the ICTR 
could be improved as a post-conflict justice mechanism. Whilst it is simple to point to such flaws, it is 
much less simple to suggest a viable alternative. Thus, the ICTR must be credited with convicting 
perpetrators amid an undoubtedly tumultuous set of circumstances. 
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THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
by Lara Miles 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Syrian civil war remains in a state of protracted conflict with no sign of resolution. Efforts at 
mediation thus far have failed to bring about successful peace, which can be attributed in part to the 
complexities of the multiple parties to the conflict, and a lack of political will both internally and 
externally. The solution lies in a revised approach to mediation whereby non-veto players are excluded 
from negotiations, the Syrian rebel forces are encouraged to adopt a more united position, and the 
international community acts as a third part guarantor – with particular concessions from the US and 
Russia. Only by addressing the particular challenges of the Syrian context can a peaceful and diplomatic 
resolution be reached. 
 
In 2011, liberal activism in Egypt and Tunisia sparked protests in Syria against the Bashar al-Assad 
regime. The Assad government responded with extreme and violent measures to suppress the uprisings, 
which quickly escalated into civil war. While there are multiple parties to the conflict, the primary 
combatants are the Syrian Government (the Assad regime) and the rebel forces – grouped collectively as 
the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and their military force, the Free Syrian Army (FSA).261 The Arab 
Spring promised to bring about positive change and new beginnings; however, for Syria, it has thus far 
resulted in protracted conflict with an estimated 125,000 Syrian deaths as of January 2014, significant 
refugee flows, and threats to regional stability.262 
A variety of sources have been attributed to the conflict, both economic and cultural; Paul Miller cites 
corruption, stagnation, and autocracy in Syria as the original drivers of protests. However, it is now 
recognised that the conflict has taken on an increasingly sectarian tinge through clashes between the 
rebelling majority Sunni population and the minority Alawite sect government.263 Ted Carpenter 
identifies Syria as a “fragile ethnoreligious tapestry that could easily unravel”, with an ethnically diverse 
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population littered with histories of grievances.264 Thus, Carpenter argues that a primary driver of 
conflict has been the Sunni Arab population’s attempt to overthrow Assad’s ‘coalition of minorities’ 
regime, a claim supported by emerging evidence that the majority of participants in the SNC and FSA are 
Sunni citizens, and similarly, that Assad’s military is primarily dominated by Alawites.265 These ethnic and 
sectarian drivers of conflict should be of particular concern, given that conditions and dynamics in Syria 
reflect those present during the drawn-out sectarian conflict that plagued Lebanon during the 1970s and 
1980s, and the situation that exists in Iraq today.266 
Third-party attempts to curve the Syrian conflict thus far have included the dispatch of peace envoys 
and a UN monitoring force; sanctions imposed by the United States, regional powers, and certain 
members of the Arab League and the European Union;267 and mediation and peace talks that have been 
conducted since the start of the conflict – the most recent being the Geneva II talks in early 2014. 
The benefits of mediation as a means of conflict resolution are well documented, and it is recognised as 
the “most common form of peaceful third-party intervention in international conflicts”. In fact, a 1996 
statistical assessment of conflict management techniques praised it as the most consistently effective 
approach in preventing escalation of conflict and promoting peaceful settlements.268 Bernd Beber 
defines mediation as “the non-coercive intervention by a third party in a dispute between two or more 
political entities for the stated purpose of effecting a settlement of the dispute”.269 The immediate 
benefit derived from this definition is the objective, unobtrusive, and peaceful nature of mediation – but 
additionally, it is championed by the UN for offering a cheap method of conflict resolution both in 
human and economic costs, and is subsequently more likely to receive international funding and 
support.270 However, mediation is not without its flaws; it has not always succeeded in producing a 
peaceful resolution. Its capabilities are limited when addressing complexity and in overcoming hesitancy 
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over uncertain futures.271 There is the risk of so-called ‘mediator shopping’, where intermediaries are 
played off against one another by the parties involved to optimise individual interest,272 and the impact 
of the mediator’s own invested interests in the dispute on the mediation’s proceedings and outcomes 
must also be considered.273 Finally, there is the difficulty in the inclusion and exclusion of parties to the 
conflict – especially when dealing with armed and extremist groups – that complicates communication 
and the likelihood of a successful outcome.274 
The difficulties of mediation are evidenced in the Syrian conflict, where a primary attempt at enacting 
peace failed in the six-point peace plan devised by the United Nations and Arab League’s envoy for Syria, 
Kofi Annan. Released on March 16, 2012, this initiative sought to enact an inclusive Syrian-led political 
process predicated on a ceasefire, and stressed themes of humanitarian assistance, justice, and 
freedom.275 However, the continuing conflict in Syria today is evidence of the peace plan’s failure, and it 
has been criticised for being a quick fix rather than a sustainable solution, and that it may have actually 
worsened the situation by not taking a hard-line on the Syrian Government – instead allowing Assad the 
opportunity to consolidate his position and subsequently prolong the war.276 
Yet despite mediation’s shortcomings, alternative methods of conflict resolution do not appear to offer 
a better solution. It has been suggested that a limited US military and NATO intervention, with the 
objective of reducing Assad’s military capability, could change the dynamics of the conflict in favour of 
the rebels and thus hasten Assad’s downfall.277 However, this approach would not guarantee success, 
and is likely to carry significant consequences if it were to fail. Firstly, the complex nature of the conflict, 
with fast-changing variables, and uncertain numbers and loyalties, means that it is difficult to make the 
reliable assessments needed for effective intervention. Secondly, measured air strikes launched by the 
US in the past in Iran, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan, and Afghanistan were unable to bring down regimes alone; 
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this has required a greater military investment and involvement, and the bitter legacy of US involvement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan has discouraged this level of commitment.278 
Thus, despite the previous failure of mediation in Syria, it is still considered a more preferable means of 
conflict resolution than military intervention, especially when considering the lower human and 
economic risks than its intervention alternative. Furthermore, Tobias Böhmelt argues a number of 
consecutive efforts of mediation over the course of a dispute have a greater chance of reaching a 
peaceful resolution.279 This is because the feedback from previous mediation sessions facilitates a 
process of learning, experience, trust, and understanding, for both the mediator and the parties to the 
conflict. Thus, Böhmelt expects that a positive, linear relationship would result between the culmination 
of mediations and mediation success.280 Following this logic, it is plausible to suggest that despite the 
failure of Annan’s six-point plan, further mediation attempts may result in a peaceful settlement for 
Syria. A revised approach is necessary, where imaginative but practical solutions are adopted in the 
mediation process to address the particular challenges of the Syrian context – namely, the multiple 
parties to the conflict, and the lack of political will internally and externally to submit to negotiations 
and compromise. 
 
With Annan’s resignation as special envoy to Syria, he warned that “without serious, purposeful and 
united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for me, or 
anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps 
necessary to begin a political process”.281 This is a crucial point of failure in the mediation process thus 
far; successful negotiations are dependent on the participation and cooperation not just of domestic 
parties, but external parties to the conflict. 
A particular challenge of the Syrian context is the sheer number of parties to the conflict. On the side of 
the belligerents, there is of course the Syrian Government, which is well armed and has the additional 
use of local militias; foreign support from Russia and Iran, who provide financial and military support, as 
well as Russia’s veto status on the UN Security Council; and finally, there is the support of Hezbollah, a 
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Shi’a Islamist militant group based in Lebanon, who are recruited to fight on behalf of Assad and defend 
Syria’s Shi’a religious sites.282 The opposition forces consist of the SNC and FSA; another rebel grouping 
called the Islamic Front, which consists of a number of modestly sized Salafist groups who believe in the 
literal transcription of the Quran, and seek the imposition of strict Islamic law; the Kurds, who view 
themselves as primarily neutral in the conflict, and have adopted a defensive position; regional support 
from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who provide funding for rebel arms purchases; international support, 
provided primarily by the US, in the form of nonlethal and humanitarian assistance, and suspected 
limited military and arms support to the more moderate opposition forces in the wake of the Ghouta 
attack in August 2013; and finally, there is the growing importance of the jihadists, some of whom have 
links with Al-Qaeda.283 
The fractured nature of the SNC has proved problematic for mediation. While the rebel coalition groups 
of the SNC and FSA have essentially acted as an umbrella group for the disparate rebel groups, a source 
of legitimacy, and a means of mobilising international support, they are “at best, a very loose collection 
of militia groups with minimal coordination among one another”.284 This disunity is to be expected when 
considering the systemic suppression and denial of opportunity afforded to opposition by the four 
decades of rule by the Assad father and son duo, but it poses challenges to presenting a coordinated, 
united rebel negotiating position.285 The US and Russia further complicate the situation; accused of 
protracting the conflict, they remain deadlocked on UN Security Council resolutions concerning the 
Syrian conflict. Both states have been unwilling to compromise on matters of Assad’s resignation, which 
has given little incentive for their Syrian allies to cooperate in negotiation.286 
In fact, Böhmelt states that uncertainty and complexity in conflict – such as multiple and changing 
parties – is a primary contributor to mediation failure.287 Furthermore, Michael Grieg argues that there 
is a correlation between the number of parties involved in the conflict and the prospect for successful 
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mediation: firstly, as the number of parties grows, it complicates communication, as coordination 
becomes tougher and misunderstandings more likely; secondly, an increased number of parties raises 
the risk of the process being spoiled due to competing interests and subsequent vetos; thirdly, it 
increases the likelihood of commitment problems to a settlement, especially as a lack of enforcement 
results in low confidence levels.288 
David Cunningham proposes two rules to guide the question of participation in mediation: to simply 
include all veto players to the conflict, and exclude all non-veto players.289 Given the complex bargaining 
dynamics that accompany a multi-party conflict, Cunningham maintains that veto players – those with 
“the capability to unilaterally block settlement of a civil war” – should be prioritised as opposed to those 
players who are party to the conflict, but are too weak or lack the capacity to spoil an agreement or 
block an end to the conflict.290 Including veto players is crucial; otherwise, their grievances and demands 
will go unsatisfied, and the conflict will be likely to continue regardless of any agreements between 
other parties. Cunningham suggests two strategies to incentivise participation by veto players: to 
declare the negotiations open whether that party participates or not, or to attempt piecemeal 
negotiations, whereby governments negotiate with rebel groups individually and produce a series of 
bilateral agreements.291 The logic of excluding non-veto players is to reduce competing interests and 
unnecessary concessions; if a player is included in negotiations, their participation almost guarantees 
that their interests will be reflected in the settlement. However, concessions given to non-veto players 
reduce the incentives available to induce veto players to settle.292 
Applying this logic to Syria, it is not immediately apparent which parties can be classified as veto players. 
Obviously, the Assad government must be present in all negotiations, and so must some representation 
of the rebel forces, provided the SNC can present a united front. Additionally, there’s the question of 
regional and international players. Cunningham suggests that the significant involvement and invested 
interest of the US and Russia in the conflict may render them veto players, and subsequently, it may be 
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necessary for the UN Security Council to be party to a Syrian resolution. All other parties should be 
excluded.293 
 
Beyond the issue of multiple parties, Miller suggests that the reason for the failure of Syrian peace talks 
lies with a lack of political will.294 Ultimately, the willingness of combatants to participate in negotiations 
is weighed through a cost-benefit analysis, whereby their participation is dependent on their perception 
that there would be less to gain from continued fighting. Thus, veto players need to be pushed to the 
negotiating table through incentives and expectations. The question is when the Syrian context will 
reach the dynamics and conditions necessary for the parties involved to see negotiation as a legitimate 
alternative to war.295 A prime determinant of this is the perception of the likely outcome of the conflict 
held by the combatants, a view termed by Miller as the “shadow of the future” – the estimations of 
costs and benefits of fighting, as well as the expectations of behaviour from the opponent.296 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) identified a dissonance between the expectations of the Syrian 
opposition forces and those of the international community, and suggests that this confusion 
contributed to inaction by both parties.297 The ICG argues that the Syrian rebel coalition viewed 
themselves as essentially the democratic expression of the uprising – as opposed to a legitimate 
opposing force to the Assad regime – with the expectation that the West would follow the 2011 Libyan 
precedent and intervene when conflict escalated.298 As previously mentioned, however, the US lacks the 
necessary political will to engage in another full scale military intervention, and furthermore, there is a 
reluctance in the international community to use the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) following 
the controversy over Libya. When R2P was enacted in Libya, the UN forces were accused of 
overstepping their mandate by undertaking offensive air support to the National Transitional Council of 
Libya, and as consequence, the international community – particularly Russia and China – fear that R2P 
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effectively sanctions US-led military interventions into other states’ sovereign affairs.299 Adding to 
unfulfilled expectations, the credibility of the international community was undermined when no action 
was taken after the Ghouta chemical attack, despite US President Obama’s declaration of a so-called 
‘red line’ on Assad’s use of chemical weapons.300 Such instances cultivate a culture of mistrust, and thus, 
“the gulf between Western intent and opposition expectation prompted a cycle of pressure and 
frustration”, and while it was in the interest of both the Syrian political opposition and their 
international allies to realise an Assad-free Syria, there was not the necessary political will to 
meaningfully pursue this outcome.301 
This is where the international community can play a positive role in the mediation proceedings. 
Combatants to a conflict are more likely to cooperate and negotiate as their expectations for the future 
solidify, and by showing a commitment to post-war Syria, the international community can decisively 
influence and shine light on the future.302 The ICG argues that a negotiated solution in Syria is 
dependent on concessions from the US and Russia – that Moscow would have to push for a 
transformation of the Syrian power structure, and that Washington would need to move from its 
implicit position on regime change to an explicit position on power sharing.303  Miller predicts that if the 
international community is able to act as a guarantor on a negotiated solution and commit to peace and 
the provision of resources for reconstruction, then it is able to assure the Syrian factions, and show that 
they have more to gain from negotiations than conflict.304 
 
CONCLUSION 
The international community is divided on how to address the conflict in Syria. Efforts thus far at 
peacekeeping and mediation have failed to produce any lasting peace, and the failure of Annan’s six-
point peace plan casts doubt on the likelihood of a democratic resolution. However, despite its lack of 
success up until this point, mediation presents itself as the most effective means of conflict resolution 
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for Syria. Its cumulative effects of trust and experience for the negotiating parties promises to breed a 
culture of predictability and security, wherein the veto players of the Assad government and a united 
rebel opposition have the potential to negotiate – depending on the assurance of the international 
community acting as a third-party guarantor. By adopting an approach that pragmatically addresses the 
challenges of the fractured SNC, the US and Russian deadlock, and the lack of internal and external 
political will, mediation can offer an effective and peaceful method of resolution for the conflict in Syria. 
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AFGHANISTAN POST-2014 WITHDRAW OF TROOPS: POSSIBLE 
APPROACHES TO PROMOTE LASTING PEACE 
by Nicole Tape 
 
By the end of 2014, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), if the timetable has not changed, 
will have withdrawn from Afghanistan. After a period of transition, which has already begun, full 
responsibility for security of the country will be transferred to the Afghan National Security Force 
(ANSF), even though the Taliban insurgency still exists, and the ANSF are neither sufficiently trained nor 
manned to be able to defeat the Taliban.305 
Several states have a key interest in Afghanistan: America’s goal is to eliminate al-Qaeda and ensure the 
country does not become a base for training terrorist groups; Pakistan wants to limit the role of its long-
standing enemy, India; Iran desires the removal of the American presence and is concerned about the 
inflow of opium and Afghan refugees; India has economic interests in Afghanistan and wants to reduce 
Pakistan’s influence; and Central Asian states are concerned about the possible spillover effects of yet 
another breakdown of its troubled neighbour.306 With so many countries and conflicting interests, it is 
little wonder that a successful peace process has so far been unobtainable. 
 
HISTORY OF WAR 
Afghanistan has a long history of war. Over the past 170 years, the country has experienced four direct 
interventions by Western powers: two Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–42, 1878–80), a Soviet occupation 
(1979–89) and an American-led invasion from 2001–present.307 
Each Western power had varying motives for taking a military presence in the country. The Soviet Union 
intervened in support of a failing client regime, fearful it would appear weak if it did nothing to prevent 
the new revolutionary Afghan socialist government from collapsing.308 This war is still fresh in people’s 
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minds and is a contributing factor to neighbouring countries having a keen interest and being fearful of 
the outcome of the 2014 US withdrawal. The destructive legacy of the decade-long Soviet invasion led 
to the deaths of a million Afghans and sent at least four million refugees fleeing to neighbouring 
Pakistan and Iran. This humanitarian issue cannot be underestimated when trying to understand the 
complexity of key countries’ interest in the current war.309 
Until 1997, the US viewed the Taliban as potential peacemakers in Afghanistan and supported them, as 
did Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Iran, India and Russia were strongly opposed to the type of Sunni 
extremist rule that the Taliban represented, and supported those elements that later became the 
Northern Alliance.310  Following the attacks on the US during September 11, 2001, the US invaded 
Afghanistan to not only destroy the al-Qaeda safe haven, ensuring it was no longer a base for terrorist 
activities, but to also ensure that chaos in Afghanistan did not destabilise its neighbours, especially 
Pakistan.311 
Whatever the driving force behind both invasions, both the Soviet Union and America tried to 
implement strikingly similar policies once they had established themselves in the country. The Soviet 
Union immediately restructured the Kabul government and security services to better resemble those 
they had used in other Soviet client states, installed representatives in all Afghan ministries to ensure 
government officials carried out planned reforms, and set about training a new army.312 After the 
Soviets’ initial expectation of transforming Afghanistan’s political structure and its people proved 
unrealistic, they became more open to letting the Afghans do things their own way, and redefined their 
benchmark for success downward, settling for finding an Afghan leader who could keep control of the 
country with only ‘over the horizon’ assistance.313 In hindsight, this can be regarded as a conflict 
management policy failure, as the civil war that resulted in the fall of the Communist regime in 1992 
lead to the rise of the Taliban in 1995. 
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Mikhail Gorbachev, who made the decision to withdraw in 1985, felt the war had become an expensive 
stalemate, and the Soviet Union opted to base its exit strategy on diplomacy and the idea that the 
Afghan Government should pursue peace talks with its armed opponents.314 This differs from the US 
policy, which focuses on combat duties and responsibility for security of the country being transitioned 
from ISAF to the newly trained Afghans of the ANSF. 
For the past ten years, the US pursued a policy of Afghan nation-building in the hope of creating a highly 
centralised government with a robust security force, democratic political system and a strong economy 
whilst also attempting to bring social Afghan norms in line with international values.315 This mirrors the 
Soviet Union’s initial expectation before they realised it was unrealistic and abandoned it. After the 
Soviets withdrew in the 1990s, the country collapsed back into civil war due to a lack of international 
aid. The international community needs to reflect on this as it prepares to withdraw once again and give 
serious thought into how long-term assistance to the country will continue to ensure history does not 
repeat itself. 
The main motivation for both countries to withdraw has been cited as war-weariness, with the Soviet 
withdrawal in particular motivated by an assessment that the war could not be won.316 As American and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops prepare to withdraw at the end of 2014, the Soviet 
Union’s withdrawal should be examined by the international community to ensure past mistakes are not 
replicated. 
 
POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO LASTING PEACE 
Problems regarding Afghanistan are abundant, including rampant government corruption at both the 
national and provincial levels, an economic base dependent on foreign aid for survival, and a security 
force that lacks the skills and strength required for the country to have any chance of maintaining 
order.317 Widespread corruption is hardly surprising, given the country’s wealth originates primarily 
from an illegal drug economy and a vast, sudden influx of external transfers from aid agencies, which 
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simply overwhelmed the country’s institutional capacities to deal with them in a legally and socially 
acceptable manner.318 
The following three recommendations are put forward for consideration by both the Afghan 
Government and the international community in response to ending the conflict. They should be 
considered with an implementation timeframe of three to five years for change to be apparent. They 
would hopefully ensure a peaceful and stable country is left behind beyond the 2014 withdrawal of 
troops and the return to domestic rule. 
Peace Agreement 
First and foremost, a peace agreement settled on and signed by all major parties, in particular Pakistan, 
is critical in this process. The key stakeholders in any such agreement must be the Afghan Government, 
the Taliban, the US, NATO, India, and Pakistan. A UN-mandated mediation team should be appointed to 
oversee this process. The mediation team’s role, as an impartial third party, is to assist two or more 
adversarial groups to resolve a conflict. This small team of mediators must be mutually agreed upon by 
all of the major parties for it to have credibility. The team’s aim would be to ensure that the 
abovementioned critical stakeholders are fully consulted and will remain engaged throughout the 
negotiation process.319 For mediation to be successful, all parties must have a common interest to 
resolve the conflict and a genuine interest to see the dispute resolved.  Furthermore, the timing is 
imperative: the appointment of this team needs to occur well before the security transition and 
withdrawal of troops at the end of 2014. The team must consist of negotiators with demonstrated 
expertise in national and international affairs and needs to reflect the country’s diversity – linguistically, 
ethnically, religiously and otherwise.320 The mediators should not impose a solution onto the parties, but 
can offer suggestions. Possible suggestions may include the Taliban holding a share of government if the 
international community fully withdraws from Afghan soil, or the possibility of redefining the country’s 
borders. The North could be incorporated into bordering Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with 
easy integration, as the majority of the population speak Uzbek or Farsi. It could be suggested to the 
stakeholders that conflict may reduce if the country was divided along agreed religious boundaries. It 
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must be accepted that the mediation process can lead to imperfect trade-offs, so open-mindedness 
would be necessary by all parties to find creative options to achieve lasting stability. 
Taliban hold a share of Government 
The international community may need to reconsider its goals and face the possibility that defeating the 
Taliban may not occur, especially before the 2014 withdrawal of troops. Negotiating with the Taliban to 
produce a peaceful settlement should be seriously considered, and may include giving them the share in 
government they so desperately desire. As it has become clear to the Taliban that they will not be able 
to take full control of the government and rule by military means alone, they have changed their 
narrative, with their primary goal now being to free the country of foreign troops.321 The problem with 
this scenario is that the US would need a guarantee from the Taliban that if they withdraw, the country 
will not become a safe haven for terrorists, and they would respect human rights and gender equality, as 
Islam in its most extreme version is not compatible with democracy and human rights.322 The US would 
have to accept an unpalatable compromise with the Taliban, as they represent an ideology contrary to 
deeply held American values.323 This would entail America staying committed to Afghanistan in both a 
financial and military sense while the Taliban and neighbouring countries negotiate and accept this 
peace deal and establish a new government. It would also require the UN remaining in Afghanistan to 
monitor any human rights abuses and ensure perpetrators are punished, thereby sending a message 
that it will not be tolerated. 
Funding the ANSF 
If the stability of Afghanistan following the 2014 withdrawal of troops is to be maintained by the ANSF, 
the US and international community must continue to provide funding for the foreseeable future, as it is 
heavily dependent on aid to pay salaries and purchase equipment. Without substantial financial 
assistance, the Afghan Government will not be able to fund the ANSF nor provide basic services for its 
citizens.324 The ANSF could probably maintain a military stalemate indefinitely against the Taliban, but 
only if they receive large-scale financial support from the West.325 If the International community cuts 
aid to Afghanistan, and Pakistan continues to support the Taliban, the country may revert to civil war, 
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something the ANSF would not be able to control. Currently, the Taliban are unlikely to be able to fully 
defeat the ANSF if it remains funded, but the ANSF is unlikely to ever be able to drive them from their 
strongholds in the South and East of the country, funded or not. This results in a deadlock that the ANSF 
can probably sustain, but only as long as the US pays the multibillion-dollar annual bills needed to keep 
them fighting, and hence the war is likely to become a battle of stamina between the US and the 
Taliban.326 Furthermore, the recruitment processes into the ANSF need to be reviewed to ensure a more 
equitable intake across ethnicities to change the domination of Tajiks in its ranks. Its imbalanced 
representation of ethnicities, especially among the officers, and low rates of recruitment among 
Pashtuns represents two significant challenges that must be addressed.327 
 
CONCLUSION 
During the two and a half years between the Soviet Union’s decision to leave Afghanistan and the start 
of the withdrawal, the Soviet Union did what it could to build up and train Afghan forces. There are 
some similarities with the current NATO strategy, but the big difference is that the Soviet leadership 
never made this so-called transition the cornerstone of its policy, as NATO governments are doing.328 
The current withdrawal is likely to differ from that of the Soviet Union, as in Moscow, when their army’s 
retreat was over, almost every Russian politician accepted that it had been a disaster to use ground 
troops in a foreign country’s civil war.329 It is unlikely the same concession will ever be made by the 
Americans. 
A solution based purely on politics will not end this conflict. It will take negotiation on all sides, as unless 
the US is willing to fund a much larger, longer war effort, the best alternative is compromise. In any 
negotiation or mediation process, not every party will achieve everything they want, but all parties will 
get a little of something they want, and this case will be no different. The chief difficulty facing the 
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international community will be finding a multilateral formula to advance the interests of every 
participating state, even though that formula may not always benefit all participants equally.330 
At a minimum, the US would expect the Taliban to abandon violence, disassociate from al-Qaeda, and 
abide by Afghan law. This would at least preserve the two vital US national interests at stake: that 
Afghan soil not become a base for terrorists to attack the West, and that it not become a base for 
destabilising Afghanistan’s neighbours.331 In exchange, the Taliban would expect to become a legalised 
political party, receive seats in parliament, and a guarantee that any remaining foreign forces would 
withdraw from Afghan soil. The Taliban would still consider a peace agreement that guarantees all 
military forces withdraw from their soil as a victory to them. 
Of course, a deal with the Taliban would need to ensure the hard-won rights of Afghan women, basic 
human rights, and that democracy is protected. It would also raise the question of whether the liberal 
West could consent to such a deal, since respect for human rights and gender equality have never been 
trademarks of Taliban rule.332 Although violence should decrease, a deal such as this may cause just as 
many serious human rights violations. It is therefore recommended that a UN monitoring force be sent 
to Afghanistan immediately, if this deal is brokered, to ensure human rights and gender equality are 
maintained. 
The international community is obliged to the citizens of Afghanistan, who, after having endured 
countless years of conflict, are left with a country in a better state than before. A carefully shaped post-
2014 policy by the international community could influence the course of history and make peace in 
Afghanistan an achievable goal. 
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